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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
FMEA/CIL INSTRUCTIONS AND GROUND RULES
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company was selected in June
1986 to conduct an independent assessment of the Orbiter
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis/Critical items List (FMEA/CIL).
Part of this effort inv0ived an examination of the FMEA/CIL
preparation instructions and ground rules. Assessment objectives
were to identify omissions and ambiguities in the ground rules
_hat may impede the identification of shuttle orbiter safety and
mission critical items, and to ensure that ground rules allow
these items to receive proper management visibility for risk
assessment.
Documentation reviewed included both the Rockwell FMEA/CIL Desk
Instructions 100-2G dated 31 January 1984, and the NASA
Instructions for Preparation of FMEA/CIL for the STS, Basic, NSTS
22206 dated September, 1986. The Rockwell document has been used
for years in the development of the orbiter FMEA/CIL baseline.
NSTS 22206 was introduced recently to provide consistency in the
appro_h and preparation of FMEA/CIL across the various NSTS
project offices.
Assessment objectives were followed during the performance of the
assessment without being influenced by external considerations
such as effects on budget, schedule, and documentation growth.
Assessment personnel were employed who had a strong reliability
background but no previous space shuttle FMEA/CIL experience to
ensure an independent assessment would be achieved. Highlights
of the assessment are presented below.
NOT ALL ESSENTIAL ITEMS ARE IN THE CIL FOR MANAGEMENT VISIBILITY.
Existing automatic ground rules allow safety critical 1R/3 items
to be excluded from the CIL. These items do not receive
retention rationaie, ....special attention, or direct Level II
management visibility. Retention rationale provides for the
documentation of critical item design, test, inspection, and
failure history data needed for risk assessment. Inspection,
test planning, and maintenance procedures ensure the integrity of
the item. Upper-level visibility of all critical items is
warranted to maintain awareness of safety and reliability issues.
w
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GROUND RULES OMIT FMEA/CIL COVERAGE OF ITEMS THAT PERFORM
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS.
Test ports, mechanical structures, wiring harnesses, and circuit
protection devices do not receive adequate FMEA/CIL coverage.
These items often perform critical functions that warrant
FMEA/CIL identification of their contribution to safety risk.
For example, critical failures related to test ports have played
a major concern in space and commercial programs. An Eastern
Airlines L-I011 aircraft experienced a complete three-engine
flameout in flight as a result of leakage from three oil fill
plugs. Of equal imp0rtance, wiring harnesses are exposed to
operational wear, fatigue, and ground turnaround abuse that can
cause latent critical failures. Experience shows that ground
personnel can damage wiring during routine maintenance and
inspection.
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ESSENTIAL ITEMS EXCLUDED FROM THE CIL DO NOT RECEIVE DESIGN
JUSTIFICATION.
The current ground rules allow some life-critical items to be
excluded from the CIL. Design acceptability in the form of
retention rationale is required for CIL listed items to
determine, in a timely manner, if redesign is necessary or that
the risk is acceptable. This design Justification exclusion
allows potentially high-risk life-essential items to remain
unnoticed until operational impacts surface. A Level II
awareness void is created through the absence of these life-
essential items on the CIL.
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FMEAs/CILs ARE NOT UPDATED IN A TIMELY MANNER.
Once the FMEAs and CILs are prepared, experience has shown that
the contents eventually become obsolete. A low-risk item with
good retention rationale can become a high-risk item as a result
of changes and trends that do not get timely reassessment and
resolution. Keeping FMEA/CIL data current will provide earlier
Level II management awareness of risk changes resulting from
design modifications, test and inspection changes, and failure
trends.
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w In addition to the above issues, a number of other issues were
identified that correct FMEA/CIL preparation instruction
omissions and clarify ambiguities. The assessment was successful
in that many of the issues havesignificant safety implications.
implementation of the recommendations presented in this report
will ensure a safer and more reliable orbiter, as well as help
meet both the letter and the intent of the Rogers Commission's
recommendations.
w
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m2.0 INTRODUCTION:
mm
The FMEA/CIL process is a systematic, methodical analysis
performed to identify and document identified failure modes at
prescribed hardware levels, and to specify the resultant effect
of each failure mode on the subsystem, interfaces, mission, crew,
and vehicle. The FMEA process requires a thorough and well-
defined set of ground rules to guide the analyst in the
identification of all potential critical failure modes that exist
in the orbiter and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). With
proper management evaluation and resolution of the FMEA results,
critical failure modes can either be eliminated or reduced by
redesign and/or controls, or be accepted as an "acceptable risk".
Items that qualify for the CIL, by virtue of their critical
failure modes, are given special attention that is required of
CIL items to ensure a safe and dependable orbiter. The CIL can
be a powerful management tool if it is utilized as a single
reference source and repository of all these kinds of data.
The assessment objectives of this study were to identify ground
rule omissions and ambiguities that may impede the identification
of orbiter safety and mission critical items and to ensure that,
once identified, these items are given proper management
visibility, evaluation, and resolution.
The FMEA/CIL ground rules assessment primarily examined the
Rockwell Desk Instructions 100-2G, dated 31 January 1984.
Rockwell reference documents were included in the review, with
the exception of Engineering Operations Manuals (EOM's).
Rockwell EOM's were not made available to the IOA contractor.
The NASA Task Monitor reviewed the applicable sections and found
no issues that would effect the assessment. No Rockwell
documentation was reviewed that provided insight into the
Rockwell FMEA/CIL management visibility, evaluation, and
resolution process.
During the assessment, the Instructions for Preparation of
FMEA/CIL for the STS, Basic, NSTS 22206, dated September 1986,
was approved by the Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB).
Review of the NSTS 22206 document was included as part of the
assessment to de--_rmne_f the Rockwell 100-2G assessment issues
were resolved. The NASA document was a significant improvement
over the Rockwell document both in scope and clarity of
instructions.
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3.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The independent assessment was successfully accomplished in an
objective and unbiased environment. Important issues were
surfaced for enhancing the orbiter safety and reliability goals.
Major issues are discussed in the text, and all issues are
identified in the appendices, including recommendations.
Appendix A presents the issues related to the Rockwell 100-2G
ground rules and Appendix B pertains to the NSTS 22206 document.
Appendix C presents the assessment issues in_fl-n-g chart form.
The following text discussion addresses the issues found in the
review of both documents, ex?ept when noted, and a matrix is
provided for Issue _traceabllity and impacts to reference
documentation. Issues are segregated into Omissions,
Ambiguities and Limited Visibility, Evaluation, and Resolution.
W
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3.1 OMISSIONS
3.1.1 NOT ALL FUNCTIONALLY CRITICAL ITEMS ARE ON THE CIL
Automatic ground rules exist in both Rockwell 100-2G and NSTS
22206 which allow items that perform life and vehicle essent--_
_ions to be omitted from the CIL. Specifically, these are
redundant _items _ that per_0rm _ critical functions but pass
redundancy screens, and are defined as hardware criticality 3.
Life/vehicle or mission essential items that are CIL excluded do
not require retention rationale, and do not receive the same
special attention and direct Level II visibility that CIL items
receive.
Review of NHB 5300.4 (ID-2), page_3-2, item ID301 3.C states:
Equipment appearing on the CIL wiii be given special
attention in establishing hardware specifications and
qualification requirements; in manufacturing, inspection and
test planning; and in the formulation of operating and
maintenance procedures and mission rules.
It therefore follows that the NASA intent is to give extra
attention tO items _appearing_ on-the CIL. _.......If this indeed is
NASA's intent, then Rockwell 100-2G and NSTS 22206 ground rules
frustrate this aim by providing means for a functional
criticality IR or 2R item to escape appearing on the CIL. Al___!l
hardware whose failure could directly lead to the destruction of
5
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the vehicle or death of the crew should be on the Critical Items
List and given extra attention. Any other interpretation places
secondary considerations ahead of safety.
Allowing hardware to be_eXciuded from £he CIL as a result of
redundancy or passing paperwork "screens" causes a void in the
control/assessment process. Attention and controls during
manufacturing, assembly, test, failure reporting, corrective
action review, and flight readiness reviews are less effective
when all hardware that performs critical functions is not
considered, treated, or documented completely and consistantly.
Based on the Presidential Commission Report's position on
management awareness, it is recommended that all automatic ground
rules for excluding functional criticality iR and 2R items from
the CIL be eliminated. If items are to be eliminated, they
should be brought forward to the NSTS Program Level II Change
Board for approval before they are dropped from further tracking.
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3.1.2 ITEMS THAT PERFORM CRITICAL FUNCTIONS ARE EXCLUDED FROM
FMEA/CIL COVERAGE.
Existing FMEA ground rules allow for certain hardware items and
failure modes to be excluded from analysis requirements. NSTS
22206 is a significant improvement over Rockwell 100-2G, in
reducing omissions, especially in the structures area. How_ve3,
the NSTS 22206 rules still allow for less-than-desirable FMEA
analys--_in areas such as test ports, wire harnesses, connectors,
and power interruption devices.
a. Critical test ports related failures have played a major
concern in Space and Commercial programs. An Eastern
Airlines L-1011 experienced a flameout of all three engines
as a result of leakage around the oil fill plugs. A Delta
86 rocket failure occurred, a probable cause being an
oxidizer purge port plug failure. Rockwell i00-2G ruled out
separate test port analyses and NSTS 22206 still does not
flag their importance. It i-s recommended that an
instruction be added to emphasize that Capped ....and plugged
test ports be analyzed individually, so that their
contribution to critical failure modes is identified, and
that their importance be adequately relayed to those
agencies which handle maintenance.
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Do Wire harness4s_ cables, and connectors carry critical
commands, controls, and power functions throughout the
orbiter. Except for verification that adjacent connector
pin shorts do not result in loss of crew or vehicle, no
FMEAs or additional analyses are required. These items are
exposed to operational wear, fatigue, potential errors and
ground turnaround abuse. Latent failures are of concern as
a result of these conditions which could have critical
consequences. It is therefore recommended that wire
harnesses, cables, and connectors be analyzed to identify
that they carry critical functions and be treated as CIL
items if merited by criticality. In this way they will
receive additional inspections and tests beyond those
accomplished for similar items carrying, nonessential
functions.
c. "Fails to operate" for fuses is specifically omitted by
Rockwell 100-2G, and review of FMEA specific rules reveal
that circuit breaker "failure to trip" was not considered in
the Rockwell FMEAs. Neither did NSTS 22206 address circuit
protection devices. The tendency of an analyst is to omit
this failure mode from the analysis using the argument that
a failure is necessary before the device is required, and
the FME considers only one failure at a time. Circuit
protection is a special item similar in concept to a safety
or emergency item. It should be assumed the failure exists
and the device must work. Circuit protection devices are
sized to protect the downstream wiring and equipment. A
failure to interrupt with a downstream failure could result
in fire due to overheating of wiring and/or equipment.
Another consequence is: if upstream circuit protection is
sensitive to the problem, the upstream or main bus
protection device will interrupt the circuit to isolate the
failure. This maln-bus loss will simultaneously interrupt
power to many functions, which Could have_"laheral " System
wide critical consequences. It is recommended that specific
"fails to operate" instructions be added for circuit
protection devices and be part of the FMEA analysis to flag
the criticality and potential hazard of each device.
7
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3.1;3 NOT ALL FUNCTIONALLY CRITICAL ITEMS REQUIRE FORMAL
DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE (DESIGN JUSTIFICATION)
Design acceptability in the form of retention rationaie is
required for all items listed on the CIL. Inadequate retention
rationale would make the critical item a redesign candidate.
Good rationale showing that a critical item is of low risk would
be grounds for a waiver and Level II acceptance.
Since retention rationale is Of sufficient importance in determi-
ning high risk, it should be required and documented for all
items that perform critical functions on the orbiter. Paragraphs
3.1.1 and 3.1.2 discuss those items that are not included on the
CIL. These exclusions could allow a potential high risk life
essential item to be excluded from NSTS Program Level II Change
Board awareness. This is also additional rationale to support
the recommendation that all 1R and 2R items be included on the
CIL.
3.1.4 IN-FLIGHT TESTING IS NOT FORMALLY CROSS LINKED WITH
CRITICAL ITEMS AS IS DONE WITH OMRSDs FOR GROUND TURNAROUND
No provisions exist in Rockwell 100-2G to ensure that FMEA/CIL
identified failure modes are detected during ground turnaround.
The Preliminary Draft of NSTS 22206 contained a provision to
maintain an Operational Ma---_enance Requirements and
Specification Document (OMRSD) matrix to track FMEA/CIL items in
the OMRSD. Although the matrix was not adopted as part of the
approved NSTS 22206, Basic version documentation, the matrix will
be mainta_-n-_as a-----_independent entity and will make reference to
the FMEA/CIL identified items.
In-flight verification of redundancy and the assurance that
failure modes do not exist is at least as important as ground
turnaround. Therefore, it is recommended that a matrix similar
to the OMRSD matrix be adopted to provide tracability between in-
flight checkout and critical items to provide an awareness by
both the crew and the ground in advance of potential problems.
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3.1.5 REDUNDANCY SCREENS ALLOW OMISSIONS
All IR/3 and 2R/3 items are tested against three redundancy
screens. These critical function items are not included in the
CIL if they pass the Screens.
Issues were identified related to all three screens.
am The first screen is: "The redundant elements are capable of
checkout during the normal mission turnaround sequence."
"Capable of checkout" allows for conjecture on the part of
the FMEA preparer. Provisions that are included in a design
to provide checkout capability may never be used due to
omission or later deletion of checkout procedures.
It is recommended that the words be changed to "elements ar___ee
checked out" to assure the screen is passed.
b. The second screen is: "Loss of a redundant element
readily detectable during flight."
is
"Readily detectable" does not assure safety of the crew or
vehicle unless detection is accomplished in a timely manner.
No definition exists in Rockwell !00-2G to define "readily
detectable." While NSTS 22206 does contain a definition,
even that can be improved upon.
It is recommended that the following definition be adopted
into both NSTS 22206 and Rockwell 100-2G.
"Readily detectable requires the capability of getting a
crewmember to respond to a problem notification via real-
time monitored displays, on-board alerts, visual indications
or ground notification. Ground notification must not be
considered unless sufficient time is available to perform
corrective action to preclude the critical consequences of
the failure, using worst case telemetry and data."
Co The third screen is: "All redundant hardware items can be
lost by a single credible cause or event such as
contamination or explosion."
m
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This screen does not consider fire as one of the single
events or causes for failing this screen. Crew and vehicle
safety are of prime concern and fire can cause loss of
redundancy. Since the FMEA/CIL is a information source used
to assure adequate safety visibility, it should identify all
failure modes that result in potential ignition points and
inadvertent fuel sources.
It is therefore recommended that a fourth screen be added to
both Rockwell 100-2G and NSTS 22206 that states "Upon
failure does this item provide-_gn1--_n points and/or fuel
to cause and/or Support a fire?"
The "readily detectable" screen is not applicable to a
select group of hardware items as defined in NSTS 22206.
Included in this group are
io Standby redundancy (redundant paths where only one path
is in operation at a given time), and
2. Mechanical linkages.
Failed redundant elements that may be depended upon in the
event of a primary item failure could have serious
consequences if advanced knowledge of the failure is
unknown. Contingency planning may be possible provided that
the ground and/or crew are aware of the failure.
Unless periodic in-flight checkout is accomplished to verify
the exempted items operational status, it is recommended
that these item be considered to "fail" under the "readily
detectable" screen and that this recommendation be adopted
into both Rockwell 100-2G and NSTS 22206.
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3.2 AMBIGUITIES
3.2.1 CRITICALITY DEFINITIONS ARE CONFUSING AND NEED
SIMPLIFICATION
A dual system of criticality is used where an item is labeled
with both a Functional Criticality and a Hardware Criticality.
This criticality identification system allows many life/vehicle
items to be slmultaneouslylabeled with both a life/vehicle
essential and a nonessential notation. This system is not only
confusing, but it fogs the importance of the critical
contribution of an item._ To eliminate confusion and
conflicting data, a more comprehensive singular system is
recommended that eliminates hardware criticality and introduces
the number of functional paths for completeness.
Examples: IR(3) = Life or vehicle essential, possessing
three redundant paths
2R(3) = Mission essential, with
three redundant paths
This method provides a more meaningful criticality identification
without presenting conflicting information.
3.2.2 FMEA AND CIL FORMATS ARE NOT STANDARDIZED
The FMEA/CIL documenta£ion for the STS was not standardized, nor
was there any instructi0ns to provide format standardization.
Rockwell, Hamilton Standard, and SPAR all have different formats.
Standardized formats would enhance the FMEA/CIL review process,
even when specific NASA Project Offices and/or contractors are
not required to fill in all data fields. Standardized formats
for the FMEA and CIL should be incorporated into NSTS 22206 to
ensure consistency and_uniformity across the NSTS.
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3.3 LIMITED VISIBILITY,
ITEMS
EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION OF CRITICAL
3.3.1 LEVEL II CENTRAL SOURCE VISIBILITY OF
CRITICAL FUNCTION ITEMS
Based on the Presidential Commission Report's position on
management awareness, recommendations associated with issues
presented in paragraphs 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3 should be adopted
to assure that all items that perform critical functions are on
the CIL, and that retention rationale is generated for those
items. In this way, redundant designs with moderate-to-high
retention risks that could otherwise slip through the system
would get timely Program Level II attention.
Perhaps a Review Panel could be created with a SR&QA
representative, a Program Level II representative, and an
appropriate subsystem manager. The panel would assess CIL items
and their retention rationale for program risk. Those items that
are of low risk, meet proper redundancy levels, and pass
redundancy screens would get Level II awareness but not require
further detailed Level II review. The three member panel would
provide necessary checks and bounds among safety, design, and
administration.
The CIL should be the single management tool that flags safety
and reliability risk changes by maintaining the retention
rationale current to design, test, inspection, and failure
history. (See paragraph 3.3.3 regarding retention rationale.)
Elevation of risk as a result of status change should be used to
trigger a higher level of visibility for Level II review.
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3.3.2 CRITICAL FUNCTION ITEM EXCLUSION FROM THE CIL SHOULD BE
APPROVED BY PROGRAM LEVEL II
The existing FMEA/CIL ground rules allow omissions to the CIL
process as discussed in paragraphs 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.3.1.
The resulting recommendations will provide greater Level II
visibility to all items that perform critical functions.
Some critical function items that are a low risk, redundant, and
mission critical will pass all screens, and will not be tracked
on the CIL; therefore, the perogative to remove those items from
the CIL can be made by Level II on a item-by-item basis. In this
way, Level II has control of the CIL without being deprived of
full critical item awareness.
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3.3.3 DATA IN THE FMEA AND CIL IS ALLOWED TO BECOME OBSOLETE
Once the FMEA and CIL are prepared, experience has shown that the
contents are often not kept up to date. CIL retention rationale
provides very important data that are used to Justify designs and
grant waivers. Allowing these data to become obsolete can allow
a low-risk item with good retention rationale to become a high-
risk item as a result of some seemingly minor changes or trends
that do not get a FMEA/CIL reassessment. Retention Rationale as
adopted by NSTS 22206 is as follows.
a. Design - Identify design features which minimize the
occurrence of the failure mode and causes.
Test - Identify specific tests accomplished to
modes and causes during acceptance
_rtification test, and checkout tests.
detect
tests,
!ction - Note that specific inspection points are
to determine that specific failure mode causes are
Ldvertently manufactured into the hardware. Note
n requirements in mission turnaround relative to
mL -
w
m
de - Provide an indication that the hardware or
re has been used successfully and that a
failures is not developing. If the
this program, so state.
e. Operati
hardware
following
minimize
constraints
the hardware f
performed
redundancy.
Rockwell 100-2G requires
llel I ,
Describe operational effect of the
which may be taken by the crew
failure, crew training which could
hardware failure, and mission
imposed to minimize the effect of
Lde in-flight checkout procedures
improper operation/loss of
hale with the exception of
It is recommended that the including the five retention
rationale items, be maintain active control to assure
updates to these entries are iept current with any approved
design, test, and inspection changes, new failure history, or
operational use.
13
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In this way, a FMEA/CIL re-assessment will prevent potential
safety and reliability degradation to the shuttle orbiter as a
result of changes.
3.4 ISSUE IMPACT MATRIX
This FMEA/CIL Ground Rules Assessment has identified issues that
can effect several requirement and instructional documents. An
impact matrix is presented in Table 1 to identify these issues,
and to identify those documents that are impacted as a result of
each recommendation. The documents identified in the impact
matrix are NHB 5300-4 (1D-2), JSC 0770 Volume V, JSC 0770 Volume
X, Rockwell 100-2G, and NSTS 22206 (September 86).
Since the issues were basic to Rockwell Desk Instructions 100-2G
and NSTS 2220_____6,all issues effected these documents. However,
since NH___B 5300.4 and JSC 07700 deal with higher level
requirements, a much lesser---level of impact was incurred on them.
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Appendix A
Rockwell 100-2G Assessment Issues
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i. Reference: RI, 100-2G, Figure I0.
Instructions:
Problem:
Figure 10, Attached.
This figure is the road map for defining which
orbiter items appear on the CIL. Two
criticality categories are used: functional
(which does not consider redundancy) and
hardware (considers redundancy). Items that
perform critical functions, but meet defined
redundancy levels, and pass screens and are
excluded from the Critical Items List (CIL).
Exclusion creates a void in the
control/assessment process. Attention and
controls during manufacturing, assembly, test,
failure reporting, corrective action review, and
flight readiness reviews are less effective when
all hardware that perform critical functions is
not considered or treated. As a result,
potential problems (latent manufacturing/design
defects) with hardware may slip through the
assessmen_ -process without management knowing
the seriousness of the effects of failure.
Recommendation: Based onthe Presidential Commission Report's
position on management awareness, it is our
recommendation that all automatic ground rules
for excluding functional criticality 1R or 2R
items from the CIL be eliminated and that, if
items are to be eliminated, they be brought
forward to the NSTS Program Level II change
board for -_approval, Insupport of this
position, it is recommended that the figure be
replaced with a new figure shown as
_"Streamlined". Hardware criticality, in
............Roc_ell i00-2_ Fi_e-lb_ .......is replaced with a
notation showing how many paths are available to
accomplish the critical function.
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CRITICALIT_ C_TEGORY
CROSS F_[FER(NCETASL.E
/ LEVEL OF
FUNCTION / REDUNOANCY
LIFE OR /VEHICLE NO "ESSENTIAL 9UNOANCY
MISSION / NO
E_ENTIAL/ REDUNOMCY
LIFE OR /VEHICLE DUAL
F._SENTIAL/ R£OUNOANCY
,_. PASSED
SCREEN
• • .__i •,'4 SSlON UAL , .ZR
E$.ENTI AL / REDUNOANCY
ESSEntIAL/ RE_U_'_
/ ALL
ALL NON- /LEVELS OF
F._ENT IAL/ REDUNI_NC_
CRITICALITY
•CATEGORY
FUNCTIONAL
DEFINITIONS
IR
I
(CIL)
2
(CIL}
1R
(OIL)
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Figure 1 - Rockwell 100-2G, Figure 10
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Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
RI 100-2G; paragraph 3.3; item 9.
"FMEAs will not be required on structures, wire
harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors."
The orbiter, being a reusable craft, is exposed
to repeated usage stress, maintenance, and
handling. As a result, fatigue, wear, and
potential errors may result in compromise to
equipment, including those items that have been
excluded from FMEA/CIL requirements. This
allows potential critical failure modes to be
overlooked and critical hardware that deserves
CIL status not to be monitored• Structures with
sealing surfaces or other functions that are an
integral part of the hardware function, and
harnesses and connectors with inter-pin or
inter-wire shorts that cause critical
inadvertent commands are examples.
Do a FMEA to identify critical functions of
structures, wire harnesses, cables, and
electrical connectors• Track critical function
hardware on CIL.
RI 100-2G; Appendix B, paragraph 3.1.2, item I0.
Specific Ground Rules and Criteria
o STS 82-0028, para. 3.2, item 3.
o STS 82-0033, para. 3.2, item 3.
"The failure mode 'Fails to Operate' will not be
addressed for fuses."
Instructions exclude "Fails to Operate" only for
fuses, however Specific Ground Rules and
Criteria also exclude circuit breakers from the
reference STS 82 FMEA's. Fuses and circuit
breakers are used to protect downstream wiring
and equipment from excessive current. A real
hazard exists if significantly higher-than-rated
value devices are installed, or if circuit
breakers fail-to-trip. Potential fire or
ignition sources will exist as a result of a
failure of the item(s) being protected•
Include "Fails to Operate" as a failure mode for
fuses and circuit breakers to flag the
criticality and potential hazard in the
analysis.
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• Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
....RI 100-2G, paragraph 4.2.21, item 5.
"Do not consider fire as one of the
events or causes in failing Screen 'C'."
single
The FMEA should provide a complete listing of
potential ignition points and inadvertent fuel
sources to assure adequate safety visibility.
Failure to identify these sources may allow less
than adequate separation features to be
approved.
Add a Screen "D": "Upon failure, does this item
provide ignition points and/or fuel to cause
and/or support a fire?"
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Q Reference:
Instructionsl
Problem:
Recommendation:
RI 100-2G, paragraph 4.3.1, item 2.
"Test ports, when capped, shall be treated as a
structural part of the component and not be
considered further."
The rule allows test ports, when capped (plugs
also assumed), to be excluded from the FMEA.
This allows an area of potential critical
consequences to be overlooked as a result of
procedure error or cap/plug failure. Examples
include: _othe test ports between the SRB
redundant seals, Which were considered as a
potential failure point early in the Challenger
investigation; and the Delta 86 flight failure,
Where an oxidizer purge port plug was one of two
most probable causes of failure.
Include capped and plugged test ports in the
analysis so that individual contributions to
critical failure modes will be evaluated.
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. Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
RI 100-2G; paragraph 4.1.24
"CIL Retention Rationale
a. Design -- Identification of design features
which minimize the occurrence of the failur_
mode and causes.
b. Test -- Identification of specific tests
accomplished to detect failure mode and
causes during acceptance tests,
certification tests, and checkout tests.
c. Inspection -- Statement that specific
inspection points are included to determine
that specific failure mode causes are not
inadvertently manufactured into the hardware°
d. Failure history -- Provide an indication
that the hardware or similar hardware has
been used successfully and that a history of
generic failures does not exist. If the
hardware is new to this program, so state."
This retention rationale, after being generated
by the FMEA/CIL, becomes obsolete unless the
FMEA/CIL are living documents. Experience has
shown that this type of data is frequently not
kept up to date.
Category IR and 2R items that pass redundancy
screens or are N/A are excluded from the
Retention and Rationale. High risk items (e.g.,
those that might have marginal designs, be
sensitive to handling, environments, test
damage, etc.) do not get the attention and
controls that they deserve. This rationale is
too generic and does not reflect orbiter
experience.
Do not exclude 1R and 2R items from Disposition
and Rationale unless reviewed and approved by
Level II.
Maintain the FMEA/CIL under formal documentation
control to assure it is kept current and it
reflects future changes that affect the analysis
results and critical item determinations.
Include flight tests as well as ground tests
under item b.
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Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Provide and maintainan updated failure history
.....based on C/O, in£flight, and post-flight problem
discoveries (i.e., seal erosion was noted to be
occurring on several flights prior to 51L).
Trends that may influence the FMEA should be
used to update the analysis and be identified in
the control/assessment process.
RI 100-2G; paragraph 4.1.24
"CIL Retention Rationale
Failure history - provide an indication that the
hardware or similar hardware has been used
successfully and that a history of generic
i _ _a_idre does not exist. If the hardware is new
to this program, so state."
Rationale is too general and does
specifically require program experience.
not
Rewrite -- "Failure history -- provide data to
support that the hardware or similar hardware
has been used successfully and provide any
failure history that does exist. As program
experience is gained, update this data. If the
hardware is new to the program, so state."
RI 100-2G; paragraph 4.1.21
"Redundancy Screens
o The redundant elements are not capable of
checkout during the normal mission turnaround
sequence.
o Loss of a redundant element is not readily
detectable by the flight crew.
o All redundant elements can be lost by a
single credible cause or event such as
contamination or explosion."
The first screen allows elements to pass if only
capable of checkout. Capability may show good
intentions but does not assure actual checkout.
The second screen specifies "readily
detectable." This does not assure detection if
detection provisions can be re-programmed or
...._bV_@ridden. The third screen excludes fire,
which is as credible as contamination or
explosion.
I
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Recommendation: Passing the first screen should require actual,
verifiable checkout procedures supported by a
requirement. Passing the second screen should
also require actual and verifiable indications
that cannot be procedurally deleted if the
indication is not hardwired or part of a caution
and warning or alarm system. The term "readily
detectable" should be defined as follows:
Readily detectable requires the capability of
getting a crew member to respond to a problem
notification via real-time monitored
displays, on-board alerts, visual indications
or ground notification. Ground notification
must not be considered unless sufficient time
is available to perform corrective action to
preclude the critical consequences of the
failure, using worst case telemetry and data.
Add a fourth Screen "D": "Upon failure, does
this item provide ignition points and/or fuel to
cause and/or support a fire?"
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o Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
RI 100-2G, None
None (Omission)
No provisions exist in Rockwell 100-2G to assure
that FMEA/CIL identified failure modes are
detected during ground turnaround. The
Preliminary Draft of NSTS 22206 contained a
provision to maintain a OMRSD matrix to track
FMEA/CIL items against the OMRSD. Although the
matrix was not adopted as part of the approved
NSTS 22206, Basic, it will be maintained as an
independent entity and will make reference to
the FMEA/CIL identified items. In-flight
verification of redundancy and the assurance
that failure modes do not exist is at least as
important as ground turnaround.
It is recommended that a matrix similar to the
OMRSD matrix be adopted to provide tracability
between in-flight checkout and critical items,
to provide an awareness by both the crew and the
ground in advance of potential problems.
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i0. Reference:
ll.
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
RI 100-2G; paragraph 3.3, Appendix B, paragraph
3.1.1, item 13a.
"Hazards associated with the loss of fluid in
excess of requirements will be documented and
covered by hazard analysis, but will not affect
criticality."
By .....n0t effecting criticality under described
conditions, a void exists in the CIL related to
items that can propagate hazards. Release of
fluids in excess of requirements that are the
result of credible failure modes and pose a
flammability hazard could effect criticality.
Rewrite to include: "Where released fluids are
flammable or oxidizers and the possibility of an
ignition source exist as a result of released
fluids, the worst-case criticality should be
noted and the appropriate notations entered
under "HAZARDS" for Safety action."
RI 100-2G; paragraph 3.3, item I0.
"Logic diagrams (Desk Instruction i00-i,
Reliability Evaluation) will be developed only
where required to provide proper correlation
between schematics and FMEAs."
Logic diagrams in Reference i00-i are success
oriented (See Example). This appears to be a
useful procedure to understand the items under
analysis. However, no coverage is given to
negative aspects of getting inadvertent actions.
The occurrence of an undesired event can
sometimes be worse than no event. It should be
noted, however, that RI 100-2G does list
inadvertent operation as a failure mode.
Add to'Rockwell I00-i: instructions: "conduct
negative logic as-well as success logic so that
visibility will be provided for the effects of
inadvertent actions."
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Ii. (Continued)
I
Example: _o parallel motor controlled valves:
®
Logic diagram:
Spurious commands due to software/equipment
failure or human error could result in a valve
failing to remain closed after normal closure
had been accomplished and verified.
Rockwell I00-I diagram:
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112. Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
RI 100-2G, paragraph 4.6.
"...NASA will...perform FMEAs...NASA will
provide Rockwell with a copy...Rockwell will
evaluate the interface effects on the Orbiter.
The accountability of CIL items for GFE will be
to NASA. Those CIL items resulting from
interface failure modes will be a part of the
Rockwell CIL."
Are the GFE and CFE FMEAs performed to the same
rules as the Orbiter? What are the rules,
exceptions, etc.?
Consistent format and ground rules should be
followed by all so they can be properly
integrated, and any unique requirements
documented.
E
13. Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
RI 100-2G, Appendix B; paragraph 3.1.1, item 2.
"Criticality IR and 2R assumes failure of all
like and unlike redundancy: A backup item, if
when it is called upon to work, performs a
function different from the item it is backing
up, should be classified based upon the effect
if it does not work when operated. If the
backup item performs the same function as the
item it is backing up, the backup should be
classified as an unlike redundant item."
The instruction is not clear. Is the
instruction telling the analyst to classify the
backup item with the criticality of the primary
system function when the item is called upon to
operate as a backup? The final sentence seems
to be in error. If a backup item performs the
same-_unction_as the item it is backing up, it
could be like redundant, not unlike.
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Recommendation: Rewrite item 2 as follows:
Criticality 1R and 2R considers both like and
unlike redundancy. Like redundancy is backup
redundant hardware of the same type that
-performs the same function. Unlike redundancy
is alternate hardware performing a primary
function; however, if called upon, it can be
used to support a function different from its
primary assignment. An alternate item, when it
is called Upon to support a function different
than its primary assignment, should be assigned
criticality categories commensurate with both
its primary and alternate functions, and the
FMEA should indicate both roles and potential
effects. The worst case criticality should be
the primary criticality listing and the second
criticality, if lower, should be discussed in
the effects statement.
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14. Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
R I 100-2G, Appendix B; paragraph 3.1.1, 13c.
"Where external or internal leak paths are
protected by static or dynamic redundant
(verifiable) seals, the leak path effect will be
reduced by one criticality level."
The reduction by one criticality level creates
the potential to propagate misleading
information regarding designs when FMEA
summaries and CIL data are generated.
Seals and leak paths should reflect worst-case
criticality with redundancy levels provided in
the analysis and retention rationale.
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15. Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
RI 100-2G, paragraph 3.3, item 9.
"Separation of redundant functions will be
verified by selective review of design
schematics to ensure that the requirements for
separation have been incorporated and complied
with."
Design schematics may be inadequate to reveal
spatial relations.
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Recommendation: Use hardware "as-built" drawings and mockups to
recognize spatial relations that could reveal
the credibility of potential failure modes and
validate separation of redundant paths (JSCM
8080, Standard No. 4).
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Appendix B
NSTS 2220_____66,Basic, Assessment Issues
Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
NSTS 2220__66,Figure i.
Figure 1 Attached
This figure is a logic road map for defining
which orbiter items appear on the CIL. Two
criticality categories are used: functional
(which does not consider redundancy) and
hardware (considers redundancy). Items that
perform critical functions, but meet defined
redundancy levels, and pass screens and are
excluded from the Critical Items List (CIL).
This exclusion creates a void in the
control/assessment process. Attention and
controls during manufacturing, assembly, test,
failure reporting, corrective action review, and
flight readiness reviews are less effective when
all hardware that performs critical functions is
not considered or treated. As a result,
potential problems (latent manufacturing/design
defects) with hardware may slip through the
assessment process without management knowing
the seriousness of the effects of failure.
Based on the Presidential Commission Report's
position on management awareness, it is our
recommendation that all automatic ground rules
for excluding functional criticality 1R or 2R
items from the CIL be eliminated and that, if
items are to be eliminated, they be brought
forward to the NSTS Program Level II change
board for approval. In support of this
position, it is recommended that the figure be
replaced with a new figure shown as "Stream-
lined" replacement. Hardware criticality, in
NSTS 22206 Figure i, is replaced with a notation
showing how many paths are available to
accomplish the critical function.
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Figure 3 - NSTS 22206 (Figure 1) FMEA/CIL Screening Pro----cess
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Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
NSTS 22206, paragraph 2.3.1, item e.
"FMEAs are not required on wire harnesses,
cables, and electrical connectors."
The orbiter, being a reusable craft, is exposed
to repeated usage stress, maintenance, and
handling. As a result, fatigue, wear, and
potential errors may result in compromise to
equipment, including those items that have been
excluded from FMEA/CIL requirements. This
allows potential critical failure modes to be
overlooked and critical hardware that deserves
CIL status not to be monitored. Structures with
sealing surfaces or other functions that are an
integral part of the hardware function, and
harnesses and connectors with inter-pin or
inter!re shorts that cause critical inadvertent
commands are examples.
Do a FMEA to identify critical functions of
structures, wire harnesses, cables, and
electrical connectors. Track critical function
hardware on CIL.
NSTS 22206, paragraph 2.3.4, item (3).
"Does not consider f_re as one of the
events or causes in failing Screen 'C' ."
single
The FMEA should provide a complete listing of
potential ignition points and inadvertent fuel
sources to assure adequate safety visibility.
Failure to identify these sources may allow less
than adequate separation features to be
approved.
Add a Screen "D": "Upon failure, does this item
provide ignition points and/or fuel to cause
and/or support a fire?"
mm
mm
g
D
g
z
mm
z
m
m
J
m
i
mm
I
Z
m
m
l
m
B-4
m
mm
I
I
ww
L_
m
_J
w
L_
m
w
m
i
u
=
w
m
=
•
.
Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
•NSTS 22206, paragraph 2.3.3, item i.
"The criticality of instrumentation and test
ports shall be assessed according to their
function. Where instrumentation (e.g., pressure
transducer penetrates the wall of a component or
line and structural failure of the joint would
result in gross leakage, the failure mode shall
be considered as a failure of the component or
line. The criticality of the instrumentation,
therefore, would not be affected in such
instances."
The instruction does not strongly emphasize the
_importance of test ports. Critical test ports
related failures have played a major concern in
Space and Commercial programs• An Eastern
Airlines L-1011 experienced a flameout of all
three engines as a result of leakage around the
oil fill plugs. A Delta 86 rocket failure
occurred, a probable cause being an oxidizer
purge port plug failure.
Provide a separate instruction to include capped
&nd plugged test ports in the analysis so that
individual contributions to critical failure
modes will be evaluated.
Reference: NSTS 22206, Table 4, Number i0, items a,b,c,d.
Instructions: _ i'CIL Retention Rationale
t a. .....Design -" Identification of design features
d.
which minimize the occurrence of the
fai!ure mode and causes.
b. Test -- _dentification of specific tests
accomplished to detect failure mode and
causes during acceptance tests,
certification tests, and checkout tests•
c. Inspection -- Statement that specific
inspection points are included to determine
that specific failure mode causes are not
...... inadvertently manufactured into the
hardware.
Failure history -- Provide an indication
that the hardware or similar hardware has
been used SuCcessfully and that a history
of generic failures does not exist. If the
hardware is new to this program, so state."
B-5
.Problem:
Recommendation:
Reference:
Instructions:
This retention rationale, after being generated
by the FMEA/CIL, becomes obsolete unless the
FMEA/CIL are living documents. Experience has
shown that this type of data is frequently not
kept up to date.
Category IR and 2R items that pass redundancy
screens or are N/A are excluded from the
Retention and Rationale. High risk items (e.g.,
those that might have marginal designs, be
sensitive to handling, environments, test
damage, etc.) do not get the attention and
controls that they deserve. This rationale is
too generic and does not reflect orbiter
experience.
Do not exclude IR and 2R items from Disposition
and Rationale unless reviewed and approved by
Level II.
Maintain the FMEA/CIL under formal documentation
control to assure it is kept current and it
reflects future changes that affect the analysis
results and critical item determinations.
Include flight
under item b.
tests as well as ground tests
Provide and maintain an updated failure history
*based on C/O, in-flight, and post-flight problem
discoveries (i.e., seal erosion was noted to be
occurring on several flights prior to 51-L).
Trends that may influence the FMEA should be
used to update the analysis and be identified in
the control/assessment process.
NSTS 22206, Table 13, item 14.
"Redundancy Screens
o The redundant elements are not
O
O
capable of
checkout during the normal mission turnaround
sequence.
Loss of a redundant element is not readily
detectable by the flight crew.
All redundant elements can be lost by a
single credible cause or event such as
contamination or explosion."
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Problem:
Recommendation:
The first screen allows elements to pass if only
capable of checkout. Capability may show good
intentions but does not assure actual checkout.
The second screen specifies "readily
detectable." This does not assure detection if
detection provisions can be re-programmed or
overridden. The third screen excludes fire,
which is as credible as contamination or
explosion.
Passing the first screen should require actual,
verifiable checkout procedures supported by a
requirement. Passing the second screen should
also require actual and verifiable indications
that canno_ be procedurally deleted if the
indication is not hardwired or part of a caution
and warning or alarm system. The term "readily
detectable" should be defined as follows:
± ....
Readily detectable requires the capability of
getting a crew member to respond to a problem
notification via real-time monitored
displays, on-board alerts, visual indications
or ground notification. Ground notification
must not be considered unless sufficient time
is availabie-to perform corrective action to
preclude the critical consequences of the
failure, using worst case telemetry and data.
Add a fourth Screen "D": "Upon failure, does
this item provide ignition points and/or fuel to
cause and/or suppor% a fire."
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Reference:
Instructions:
.... Problem:
NSTS 22206
None (Omission)
The Preliminary Draft of NSTS 22206 contained a
provision to maintain a OMRSD matrix to track
_A/CIL items against the OMRSD. Although the
matrix was not adopted as part of the approved
FMEA/CIL NSTS 22206, Basic version
documentation, it _ be maintained as an
independent entity and will make reference to
....... the FMEA/CIL identification items. In-flight
verification of redundancy and the assurance
that failure modes do not exist is at least as
...... important as ground turnaround.
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Recommendation:
Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
Recommendation:
Reference:
Instructions:
Problem:
It is recommended that a matrix similar to the
OMRSD matrix be adopted to provide tracability
between in-flight checkout and critical items,
to provide an awareness to both the crew and the
ground in advance of potential problems•
NSTS 22206, paragraph 1.3, item d.
Devise the analysis worksheet and complete
every identified failure mode.
for
The FMEA/CIL documentation for the STS were not
standardized nor were there any instructions to
provide format standardization. Rockwell,
Hamilton Standard, and SPAR all had different
formats. Standardized formats would enhance the
FMEA/CIL review process, even when specific NASA
Project Offices and/or contractors are not
required to fill in all data fields.
Standardized formats for the FMEA and CIL should
be incorporated into NSTS 22206 to ensure
consistency and uniformity across the NSTS.
NSTS 22206
None (Omission)
"Fails to operate" for fuses is specifically
omitted by Rockwell !Q0-2G and review of FMEA
specific rules reveal that circuit breaker
"failure to trip" when required was not
considered in the Rockwell FMEAs. NSTS 22206
did not address circuit protection dev--l-ces. The
tendency of an analyst is to omit this failure
mode from the analysis using the argument that a
failure is necessary before the device is
required, and the FMEA considers 0nly one
failure at a time. Circuit protection is a
special item similar in concept to a safety or
emergency= item, ......It shou!dbe assumed that the
failure exists and the device must work.
Circuit protection devices are sized to protect
the downstream wiring and equipment. Failure to
interrupt, upon downstream failure, could result
in fire due to overheat of wiring and/or
equipment. Another consequence is that, if
upstream circuit protection is sensitive to the
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problem, the upstream or main bus protection
device will interrupt the circuit to isolate the
failure. This main bus loss will interrupt
power to many functions simultaneously, and
could have wide spread lateral systemic critical
consequences.
Recommendation: Provide specific instructions to consider the
"Fails to Operate" failure mode for circuit
protection devices and require that each device
be identified as to its criticality and
potential hazard.
Reference: NSTS 2220__66,2.3.3, item J.
Instructions: "When worst case effect of a specific failure
mode results in a launch delay, the criticality
shall be classified as criticality 3. Other
prelaunch failure modes shall be classified
according to their worst case effect."
Problem:
Recommendation:
Ground rules exclude launch delays that impact
worst-case missions which have specific launch
window(s) and/or few launch opportunities to
accomplish a specific mission.
Prelaunch failure modes that result in a launch
delay shall be classified with the appropriate
criticality.
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Appendix C
Independent Orbiter Assessment
FMEA/CIL Instructions and Ground Rules Briefing,
Presented to the STS Orbiter and GFE Projects Office/R.A. Colonna
on 22 September 1986.
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